

Clergy Discipline Measure 2003

In the Clergy Discipline Tribunal – Diocese of Winchester

Re the Reverend Dr Stephen Robert Sizer

EXPERT'S REPORT OF ANTONY LERMAN

1. My name is Antony Lerman and I have been instructed by Lee Bolton Monier-Williams ("LBMW"), solicitors for the Respondent, Dr Stephen Sizer, to provide expert evidence in connection with the Clergy Discipline Measure complaint brought against him by Marie van der Zyl, on behalf of the Board of Deputies of British Jews dated 15 August 2018.

Qualifications

2. My Curriculum Vitae is attached at 'Exhibit A'. My current roles are Senior Fellow at the Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue, Vienna; Honorary Fellow, Parkes Institute for the Study of Jewish/non-Jewish Relations, Southampton University; and Associate Editor of the journal Patterns of Prejudice, the international academic journal on racism and antisemitism.
3. My particular credentials in the field of antisemitism are more fully set out in my CV but, in summary, I was the founding Executive Director of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, the leading Jewish body focusing exclusively on research into contemporary antisemitism in Europe (1996-99 and 2006-9). I was the founding Chief Executive of the Rothschild Foundation (Hanadiv) Europe. I was the Founding Editor of Antisemitism World Report (1992-1998). I was the Editor and co-Editor of Patterns of Prejudice (1986-1999) and the Assistant Editor of Survey of Jewish Affairs (1988-92).
4. I have written and edited several books which are concerned with antisemitism and other aspects of Jewish life over the last 100 years and have written numerous articles on antisemitism published in journals, newspapers, magazines and other forms of modern media. I have also lectured and appeared as a panellist on the subject across the world.

Instructions

5. I have seen a copy of the Order of the Tribunal dated 17 August 2020 in which it was ordered that the parties should appoint their own experts. I have noted in particular to paragraphs 4 and 5 in which the Chair directs the experts to confine their evidence narrowly to informing the Tribunal *'as to the nature and scope of "Anti-Semitism" as understood from time to time in relation to the incidents mentioned in the Appendix to the President's Decision dated 28 June 2019, and with specific reference to political comment on the activities of the State of Israel'*.

6. Whilst I have not seen the President's decision referred to above, I have received a letter of instruction from LBMW which explains that the period during which the alleged misconduct took place was July 2005 and August 2018.

Duty to the Tribunal

7. Unless otherwise stated, I confirm that the facts stated in this report are within my own knowledge.
8. I understand that my overriding duty is to help Tribunal understand matters within my expertise.

The antisemitism debate

9. Although antisemitism knows no time boundaries and cannot be easily compartmentalised according to artificial time periods, the year 2005 does have special significance with respect to the understanding of antisemitism and the connection between antisemitism and political comment on the activities of the state of Israel. This is because in January 2005 the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (**EUMC**) published on its website a draft 'working definition' of antisemitism,¹ the main focus of which was to provide examples of antisemitism where Israel and Zionism were the targets; and to establish guidelines for what is acceptable political comment on Israel.²
10. The EUMC emphasised that it was part of an ongoing process having no legal basis and that it was one of several articles on its website that appeared under the disclaimer that they '*do not necessarily reflect the official position of the EUMC.*'³ Some hailed it as '*both an achievement and a landmark for all those concerned about monitoring antisemitism and the struggle against it.*'⁴ Others, such as the University and College Union (**UCU**) at its annual conference in June 2011 comprehensively rejected it.⁵
11. Writing in 2010, Dave Rich, then head of research at the Community Security Trust (CST), the private charity which monitors and combats antisemitism on behalf of the official organizations of the British Jewish community, opined: '*It has become a metaphor for all the debates about contemporary antisemitism over the past decade.*'⁶
12. Fast forward to the summer of 2018 and we find the British Labour Party embroiled in a controversy over the 'working definition' of antisemitism adopted in 2016 by the International

¹ Henceforth abbreviated to 'EUMC-WD'

² The text of the EUMC version can be found here: <https://honestreporting.com/in-praise-of-the-eumc-working-definition-of-anti-semitism/>

³ Richard Kuper, 'Hue and cry over the UCU', 1 June 2011, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/hue-and-cry-over-ucu/>

⁴ In Dina Porat and Esther Webman, eds., *The Working Definition of Antisemitism—Six Years After: Unedited Proceedings of the 10th Biennial Seminar on Antisemitism* (Tel Aviv, Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, 2012)

⁵ See <https://antonylerman.com/2011/06/02/the-farcical-attack-on-the-ucu-for-voting-against-use-of-the-eumc-working-definition-of-antisemitism/>

⁶ Porat and Webman 2012

Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)⁷ —the same definition published in 2005 by the now defunct EUMC, with some small amendments.

13. In the wake of ongoing criticism of Jeremy Corbyn for allegedly failing to deal with manifestations of antisemitism in the Party, severe pressure was placed on Labour to adopt the IHRA-WD. The Party's National Executive Committee did so, with some amendments, in the context of a newly (5 July 2018) adopted code of conduct on antisemitism. The amendments were made to allay fears that the IHRA-WD would be used to stifle free speech on Israel-Palestine—in other words to prevent the expression of normal political comment that would be critical of Israel and allow Palestinians to speak of their experience of ethnic cleansing and racism.
14. The Jewish Chronicle criticised the Party for its '*refusal to adopt antisemitism definition in full*'.⁸ But Oxford University antisemitism scholar and philosopher Dr Brian Klug described the amendments as 'enhancements'.⁹ The Party finally adopted the entire 515-word document on 4 September 2018, ditching the amendments the NEC had agreed to.
15. I bookend the period under review with these references to the IHRA-WD and its original EUMC version to illustrate the fact that the questions of whether and when political comment on Israel can be described as antisemitic have been a key feature of public, political and academic discussions and arguments about the nature of contemporary antisemitism for the last two decades (but the origins of which stretch back to the late 1970s/early 1980s).
16. Though I write of 'discussions and arguments', Professor Jonathan Judaken of Rhodes College, Memphis, a leading figure in academic antisemitism studies, has no hesitation in describing the state of debate in these terms: '*Like so much else in politics today, the debate about contemporary anti-Semitism is a dialogue of the deaf waged as a battle to the death. Both sides are correct about a number of their claims, but neither can hear the truths of the other.*'¹⁰
17. It is no exaggeration to say, as Professor David Feldman, Director of the highly respected Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck University of London, does: '*in recent years [the UK], arguably, has become the epicentre of controversy over anti-Semitism.*'¹¹ These frank statements by leading scholars affirm that 'political comment' is a very elastic term and certainly doesn't automatically imply civilised exchange when it comes to current antisemitism debates.

Anti-Zionism, antisemitism, 'new antisemitism'

18. In providing this brief overview, it is important to avoid oversimplification. The highly charged political atmosphere surrounding the issue of antisemitism must be acknowledged here but not replicated. Nevertheless, the 'shorthand' that has been used to frame the fundamental

⁷ Henceforth abbreviated to 'IHRA-WD'

⁸ <https://www.thejc.com/comment/analysis/jeremy-corbyn-labour-definition-antisemitism-1.466626>

⁹ Brian Klug, 'The Code of Conduct for Antisemitism: a tale of two texts, 17 July 2018
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/code-of-conduct-for-antisemitism-tale-of-two-texts/>

¹⁰ Judaken, 'Ten Commandments for thinking about modern antisemitism', *Forward*, 5 January 2018.

¹¹ <https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/october-2018/anti-semitism-in-historical-perspective-in-the-october-issue-of-the-emamerican-historical-review/em>, 1141.

concerns about the possible antisemitic nature of political comment on Israel is central to understanding antisemitism's nature and scope during the period.

19. I am referring first to the question of whether anti-Zionism is, or is a form of, antisemitism, and second to the broader characterisation of antisemitism during this period as largely what has come to be known as the 'new antisemitism' (also 'new antisemitism theory'¹²), to which equating anti-Zionism and antisemitism is germane.
20. These are not abstract matters only to be considered in the groves of academe. They concern the real lives of Israeli Jews, Jews generally and Palestinians; assessments and judgements of, and reactions to, Israeli policy and actions; responses of Palestinians, who are inevitably placed in an inferior position in relation to Israeli administrative and military power. The common feature here is existential precarity—and it is words that have the power to aggravate or ameliorate that condition. To quote Judaken again: '*[the] Israeli-Palestinian question is a hot global debate, and how one understands anti-Semitism is now thoroughly wound into the dispute.*'¹³
21. Feldman speaks of the issue at the heart of these debates as '*where fair comment on Israel ends and antisemitism begins*'.¹⁴ It sounds simple. But even though the many dimensions of this dilemma had already been thoroughly aired in public by 2005, by 2018 we were no nearer to finding an answer that would satisfy everyone.
22. Many of the arguments for and against equating anti-Zionism and antisemitism were presented in a 1990 collection of essays titled *Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the Contemporary World*, edited by the late Professor Robert Wistrich,¹⁵ a very prominent Israeli historian of antisemitism. The term 'new antisemitism' figured in the literature increasingly often from the 1980s. There is no consensus about what exactly it covers. Writers initially pointed to various vectors: Holocaust denial, the antisemitism of the extreme left, antisemitism in the Islamic world, anti-Zionism as antisemitism, even anti-racism as antisemitism—but all have a fairly long history.¹⁶
23. As time went by, however, one particular formulation came to be referred to and used increasingly often. It was probably first articulated and defined by Irwin Cotler, a Canadian professor of human rights law and subsequently justice minister in the Canadian Liberal government from 2003 to 2006.
24. One of its earliest appearances in print was in 1992 when Cotler wrote: '*In a word, classical antisemitism is the discrimination against, or denial of, the right of individual Jews to live as equal members of a free society; the new antisemitism involves the discrimination against, or*

¹² Robert Fine, 'Fighting with phantoms: a contribution to the debate on antisemitism in Europe, *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 43, no. 5, 2009

¹³ Introduction to the *American Historical Review*'s Round Table on Antisemitism in historical perspective, October 2018 <https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/october-2018/anti-semitism-in-historical-perspective-in-the-october-issue-of-the-american-historical-review/em>, 1123.

¹⁴ Feldman, 'Context and considerations', introductory note, workshop on defining antisemitism, Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck University of London, 28 September 2012.

¹⁵ London: Macmillan/Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1990.

¹⁶ See the chapter 'New antisemitism, new insecurity' in Keith Kahn-Harris and Ben Gidley, *Turbulent Times: The British Jewish Community Today* (London: Continuum, 2010).

*denial of, the right of the Jewish people to live as an equal member of the family of nations.*¹⁷ This has since been encapsulated, and widely used, in a shortened form as: *'Israel is the collective Jew among the nations'*. (Like all definitions of 'new antisemitism' produced by those convinced that there is such a thing, Cotler's version has always been contested.¹⁸)

25. At the turn of the century, the combined events of the second intifada (October 2000), the Durban UN conference on Racism (August-September 2001) and the destruction of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre (11 September 2001)—all of which were cited as evidence of a global explosion of antisemitism allegedly stemming largely from Muslim and anti-Israel sources¹⁹—resulted in the publication of countless articles in print newspapers and magazines, and on the growing numbers of websites and blogs, all focused on whether this 'wave' was evidence of the 'new antisemitism'. As I have already demonstrated, and reputable academics have noted, arguments over whether there is such a thing as 'new antisemitism' continue to this day.

Communicating comment in the digital era

26. However, while critics remain vocal, those promoting the notion did so in an increasingly organized fashion. And while the internet era had barely begun when the notion of the 'new antisemitism' was increasingly figuring as an essential part of discourse on antisemitism, by 2005 and the publication of the EUMC-WD, digital forms of communication were radically changing the entire landscape.

27. What changed were the role of information technologies and the geo-global context in which they function. As Judaken explains: *'These technologies have both facilitated the global dissemination of antisemitism as well as furnishing new means of combatting it. At bottom, this electronic warfare is both a symptom and a cause of the global forces at work in antisemitism today.'*²⁰

28. The huge reverberations from these transformative developments are still not fully understood, in part because change in the digital area goes on. All this has made it ever harder to make definitive assessments of the nature and scope of antisemitism.

29. For example, one of the key indices that have been relied upon for many years now to make such judgments is annual country reports on antisemitic incidents. Although these have never been perfect, since they rely on the public to report such incidents to monitoring bodies or the police, considerable efforts have been made to refine methods and standardise monitoring across countries.

30. The rise or fall in the number of incidents has been the basis of numerous headlines, mostly reporting these numbers, often in very alarmist and even apocalyptic terms.²¹ As internet-based expressions of antisemitism grew, in the early days of relatively few incidents they were

¹⁷ Irwin Cotler, 'Defining the new antisemitism', *National Post*, 9 November 2010.

¹⁸ See Brian Klug, 'Interrogating "new antisemitism"', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 36, no. 3, 2013.

¹⁹ See Antony Lerman, 'Sense on antisemitism', *Prospect*, August 2002.

²⁰ Jonathan Judaken 'So what's new? Rethinking the "new antisemitism" in a global age', *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 42, nos. 4-5, 2008, 531, DOI: 10.1080/00313220802377453

²¹ See Simcha Epstein, 'The "highest wave of antisemitism since 1945"—is it so?', *SICSA Annual Report 2001* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University 2002).

easily included in the statistics. But over the last two decades, the number of such ‘incidents’ has grown exponentially. This threw traditional monitoring into disarray, since it was based on individual reports of individual incidents.

31. Some people continued to follow this procedure, but clearly it could not capture the extent or nature of what was being posted across numerous platforms. So the traditional understanding of an incident—a Jew insulted in the street, an antisemitic publication on sale in a book shop, a violent attack on a Jew in religious garb etc.—ceased to have any comprehensive validity.
32. In 2018, the CST figure for reported online incidents was 384, up from 247 in 2017. But this is a tiny fraction of internet antisemitism—which is, of course global; it has no boundaries and cannot be classified as ‘antisemitism in the UK’ or more or less any other individual country and has therefore rendered traditional monitoring of very little value.
33. What also changed radically was the understanding of what constitutes ‘comment’. It was one thing when the only means of expressing your view publicly was either to write a letter to the editor, offer an article to a periodical or become a journalist or commentator. And ‘comment’ meant a reasonable number of words in which to put your view across.
34. Public comment is now available to anyone with a Twitter, Facebook, Instagram etc. account where the emphasis on brevity produces a uniquely aggressive, prodding, dismissive, insulting style—sometimes deliberate, but sometimes the result of restricted space and urgency to put your view in the public domain. In these circumstances, separating ‘acceptable’ political comment on Israel from heat-of-the-moment insult, or potentially the expression of something antisemitic, is not easy. Comment isn’t what it used to be.
35. Judaken captures the process very well here:

‘In the media-driven frenzied war of words [over antisemitism], the medium is often the only message, since in many discussions in the public sphere the only thing that people often have read are the emails or blogs that have pre-scripted their response. The global flow thus helps to publicize political causes, draws together—albeit largely only virtually—unlikely alliances, and helps to generate funding for the next skirmish. All this leads to little more than the propagation of the “ticket thinking” that is the very source of the Judaeophobic imagination.’²²

36. But it is not only the alleged demonization of Israel and Zionism, but also the fight against it that benefits from the multidirectionality of globalized media technologies. ‘*Today, as instantly as an antisemitic canard enters the flow of mediascapes,*’ Judaken writes, ‘*an army of Jewish and democratic institutions, media and campus watchdogs, journalists and academics combat it, including groups mobilized by the state of Israel.*’²³
37. Fiamma Nirenstein rightly asserts that ‘*For the first time in history, a Jewish state can fight antisemitism in the international arena, and this has made things very different*’.²⁴ And it alters what constitutes political comment about the Jewish state.

²² Judaken, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 2008, 560.

²³ *Ibid*, 548

²⁴ Fiamma Nirenstein, ‘Israel, globalization and anti-Semitism in Europe’, in David I. Kertzer, ed., *Old Demons, New Debates: Anti-Semitism in the West* (New York: Holmes & Meier/YIVO, 2005), 44.

Israel changes tack: leading the fight against antisemitism

38. This involvement of Israel in the fight against antisemitism is a crucial feature of the period in question. Zionism was supposed to have defeated antisemitism so for the first four decades of Israel's existence, on the public level, the state did not play any role in defending Jewish communities from antisemitism.²⁵
39. This changed in the late 1980s when severe criticism of Israel mounted and governments linked pro-Palestinian political and violent campaigns with the security concerns of diaspora Jewish communities.²⁶
40. A policy putting Israel at the head of coordinating combatting antisemitism was implemented, but sidelined after a few years when it looked like peace with the Palestinians would result from the Oslo Accords. As the Oslo process soured at the turn of the century and the anti-Israel and anti-Jewish events referred to above occurred, Israel once again sought a leadership role in anti-antisemitism activity.²⁷
41. By 2005, after some hesitation, Israeli governments were taking this role very seriously. They set up new institutions to fight antisemitism, like the Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism²⁸ and the Ministry of Strategic Affairs²⁹ (actually reactivated rather than set up), agreed upon a definition of 'new antisemitism'³⁰ and together with major international Jewish organizations, such as the World Jewish Congress, and American bodies, such as the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Committee, engaged with international intergovernmental organizations like the OSCE and the IHRA, so as to enlist their support.³¹
42. The publication of the EUMC-WD was therefore much welcomed by Israel, since it codified the 'new antisemitism' and provided a basis for claiming any kind of criticism of Israel to be antisemitic—taking the 'could' and turning it into 'is'. A working group at the Israeli government's Global Forum gathering in Jerusalem in 2009 erroneously referred to the EUMC-WD as 'the European Union's own definition of antisemitism'. It was never that.

Israel's priority antisemitism targets

43. Since the initiation of the drive to institutionalise the fight against antisemitism, the Israeli government has chosen to focus on three specific targets: the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS), accusations that Israel pursues a policy of Apartheid in the

²⁵ Yossi Shain and Barry Bristman, 'Diaspora, kinship and loyalty: the renewal of Jewish national security', *International Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 1, 2002.

²⁶ See Antony Lerman, 'Antisemitism redefined: Israel's imagined national narrative of endless external threat' in *Jewish Voice for Peace, On Antisemitism: Solidarity and the Struggle for Justice* (Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2017).

²⁷ See David Weinberg, 'Politics of antisemitism', *Jerusalem Post*, 16 November 1997.

²⁸ See <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutTheMinistry/Conferences-Seminars/GFCA2013/Pages/defaultnew.aspx>

²⁹ See https://www.gov.il/en/departments/units/ministry_of_strategic_affairs_and_public_diplomacy

³⁰ See CFCA Press Release, 'Forum agrees upon definition of "new" antisemitism', 2 February 2004.

³¹ See Michael Whine, 'Two steps forward and one step back: diplomatic progress in combating antisemitism', in Charles Small, ed., *Yale Papers: Antisemitism in Comparative Perspective* (New York: ISGAP, 2015), 427-34.

Occupied Palestinian Territories and accusations that Israel is a racist state because, for example, its nation-state law³² excludes non-Jews from having full citizenship rights.

44. Supporters of these campaigns—Palestinians, Israeli Jews, Jews and non-Jews in the diaspora—claim that they are using non-violent means—as is their right in a democracy—to pursue their objectives, which is that Israel reverse policies and abide by UN resolutions and international law.
45. Israel claims that these campaigns seek to dismantle the Jewish state, apply double standards by not targeting other states with such criticisms, demonise the Jewish state and seek to delegitimise it—all of which, Israel and practically all of the anti-antisemitism organisations argue, are antisemitic.
46. Judging by the results of Israel’s legislation-based pushback against BDS, which even from 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs determined was a ‘severe threat’, its efforts are bearing fruit, particularly in America.
47. Netanyahu takes credit for promoting legislation against BDS in ‘most US states’, with the support of the Trump administration.³³ Donald Trump last year signed an executive order that will allow federal funds to be withheld from colleges where students are not protected from antisemitism, a move that his son-in-law Jared Kushner explained in an op-ed in the *New York Times* was based on a definition of antisemitism supported by the administration—stating publicly and on the record—that determines that ‘anti-Zionism is antisemitism’.³⁴ The definition in question being the IHRA-WD.
48. In the UK too, all of the recent Conservative governments have demonstrated sympathy with outlawing BDS. The Johnson government pledged to do so, but the Palestine Solidarity Campaign challenged the plan in the Supreme Court, which determined that it was illegal.³⁵
49. Does this prove that BDS and the other campaigns against Israel do actually constitute antisemitism? Or are they the activist consequences of political comment? There are certainly many ways in which the antisemitism contention can be disputed. For example, when the international community supported boycott actions against South Africa, no one argued that this was a manifestation of anti-white or anti-Boer racism.
50. And take the apartheid accusation. Israel’s own president opposed the nation state law in 2018, warning that it would legalise discrimination and lead to apartheid.³⁶ More direct was the Education Minister in the Netanyahu government who, when asked by an Israeli interviewer on Israeli TV whether the government’s decision never to give equal rights to

³² See ‘Jewish nation state: Israel approves controversial bill’, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-44881554>

³³ <https://mondoweiss.net/2019/07/israeli-government-minister/>

³⁴ <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-real-purpose-of-trumps-executive-order-on-anti-semitism>

³⁵ <https://www.thejc.com/news/uk/government-confirms-it-will-ban-councils-from-israel-boycotts-1.494559> ; <http://muslimnews.co.uk/newspaper/home-news/37983-2/>

³⁶ <https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-rivlin-now-cast-as-brave-gatekeeper-of-israeli-democracy-and-morality-1.6265029>

Palestinians in the West Bank didn't amount to apartheid, replied: '*If that is apartheid, so be it.*'³⁷

51. The relevance of drawing attention to Israel's successful branding of certain forms of discourse and action as antisemitic when there is arguably no logical basis for it—unless the conditionality caveats in the non-legally binding EUMC/IHRA-WD are simply ignored—is not to adjudicate in this debate, but rather to show that, during this period, the application of political power—which any state has, to one degree or another—became increasingly decisive in determining what, in practice, was the nature and scope of antisemitism and therefore what was acceptable political comment.

Reinserting the 'working definition' of antisemitism in the international arena

52. We are all now very familiar with at least the existence of the IHRA-WD, adopted by the IHRA in 2016, if not with the entire 515-word text. In one sense it is presented as above both politics and comment. At the time that the Labour Party was considering making amendments to the examples before adopting it categorically, the Experts of the UK Delegation to the IHRA on the Working Definition of Antisemitism called the result 'a clear "gold-standard" definition of what contemporary antisemitism consists of.'
53. In a statement issued by the IHRA on their behalf they said: '*Gaining this level of international consensus was no easy feat . . . Any "modified" version of the IHRA definition that does not include all of its 11 examples is no longer the IHRA definition. Adding or removing language undermines the months of international diplomacy and academic rigour that enabled this definition to exist.*'³⁸
54. While we must acknowledge the extraordinary attention the IHRA-WD has received, stretching, for example, from the Trump White House to local councils in the English shires, the Experts' enthusiasm requires some contextualisation with the facts.
55. In its previous original incarnation as the EUMC-WD, as mentioned above, it certainly became significant, but it was also very controversial. So the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), successor to the EUMC, dropped it from its website, said that no public authority in the EU applied the document in any way and that the FRA has '*no legal competence to develop itself any such definitions*'.³⁹
56. The framers and supporters of the EUMC-WD were understandably very concerned about it losing standing internationally. In December 2015, Professor Porat told a Knesset committee: '*I think it's necessary to renew recognition of this definition, international recognition . . . it's clear that anti-Israelism and anti-Zionism [are] more and more acquiring antisemitic tones . . .*

³⁷ See David Sheen, 'Israel's homophobic education minister Rafi Peretz peddles a vile doctrine, racist to its core', TheNewArab, 18 July 2019.

³⁸ <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/news-archive/statement-experts-uk-delegation-ihra-working-definition-antisemitism> accessed 18 August 2020.

³⁹ See Richard Kuper, 'Antisemitism and delegitimation', JNews, 22 February 2011, <https://www.jnews.org.uk/commentary/antisemitism-and-delegitimation/>

[The EUMC-WD is] certainly very valuable and it needs to be everywhere and in cyberspace.⁴⁰

57. Meanwhile, efforts were already underway, headed by the SWC and AJC to use the IHRA, created by the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust (SIF) in 2000 and institutionalised permanently as the IHRA in 2012, as the vehicle for this.
58. Despite having 'Holocaust Remembrance' as its aim, the IHRA is a highly political body, almost exclusively European, not so exclusively focused on Holocaust remembrance, used by many of its members to demonstrate that their past connections with fascism and Nazism are a thing of the past, even as leaders in some of these countries were again displaying far right, anti-democratic tendencies and either encouraging or turning a blind eye to the dissemination of antisemitic propaganda.⁴¹
59. During the final discussions in May 2016 on adopting the slightly amended version of the WD, political sensitivities and calculations came to the fore and it seems that it was only with the determination of the chair, the Romanian diplomat, Ambassador Mihnea Constantinescu, that a compromise was in effect imposed and the adoption took place.
60. A sense of the political battles that went on can be gained from the fact that very few delegation members who were there for the final plenary have been willing to talk on the record about what went on.⁴²
61. Despite the international awareness of the IHRA-WD, if anyone thought that it would settle the matter of where fair political comment ends and antisemitism begins they were very much mistaken.
62. A legal expert, Dr Rebecca Ruth Gould, has shown how the IHRA-WD has been used to stifle freedom of speech.⁴³ But especially telling is the fact that the original drafter of the EUMC-WD, Kenneth Stern, has very publicly criticised how the definition has been applied, and at a public hearing of the House Judiciary Committee of Congress where incorporating the IHRA-WD into the proposed Antisemitism Awareness Act was being discussed, warned against making it legally binding because he feared it would restrict freedom of speech.⁴⁴ He now feels that it will do more to stifle pro-Palestinian speech than protect Jewish students.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Meeting of the Aliya, Absorption and Diaspora Committee, 20th Knesset, 2nd sitting/session, protocol 55, 29 December 2015.

⁴¹ See e.g. <https://www.dw.com/en/anti-semitism-on-the-rise-in-the-eu/a-50820057>

⁴² See Antony Lerman, 'Weapons in the antisemitism wars? The IHRA working definition and the accusation of 'institutional antisemitism'', in Greg Philo et al., *Bad News for Labour: Antisemitism, the Party and Public Belief* (London: Pluto Press, 2019), 126-9.

⁴³ 'Legal form and legal legitimacy: the IHRA definition of antisemitism as a case study in censored speech', *Law, Culture and the Humanities*, 19 June 2018.

⁴⁴ JTA, 8 November 2017.

⁴⁵ Eric Cortellessa, 'The scholar who wrote the definition of antisemitism says it's been subverted', www.timesofisrael.com, 9 January 2020.

63. Feldman not only judged the IHRA-WD ‘bewilderingly imprecise’, he was very sceptical that it would help Jewish people draw attention to the bigotry they experience.⁴⁶

An important example: Fraser v University and College Union 2012-13.

64. Claiming that Zionism is intrinsic to your identity does not make it a protected characteristic: the Tribunal between Ronnie Fraser and the University and College Union 2012-13.

65. Germane to the question of antisemitism and political comments on the activities of the state of Israel is the outcome of a claim of discrimination against the University and College Union (UCU) brought by Ronnie Fraser, a member of the UCU and Executive Director of Academic Friends of Israel, and considered by an Employment Tribunal between October 2012 and February 2013.

66. Of 10 alleged incidents of antisemitism, Fraser’s main complaint of unlawful harassment was the decision of the UCU’s annual congress to reject the EUMC working definition of antisemitism, most of the text of which is devoted to examples of discourse on Israel that ‘could be’ antisemitic.

67. Fraser and his lawyers argued that his Zionist identity is a ‘protected characteristic’ under the Equality Act 2010, and that therefore the decision of the UCU at its annual congress was an act of discrimination.

68. The Tribunal was absolutely adamant that pro-Israel sentiment does not constitute a protected characteristic and that the complaint was completely without foundation.

69. In the Reasons for the Judgment, Judge A. M. Snelson wrote:⁴⁷ *‘It seems to us that a belief in the Zionist project or an attachment to Israel or any similar sentiment cannot amount to a protected characteristic. It is not intrinsically a part of Jewishness and, even if it was, it could not be substituted for the pleaded characteristics, which are race and religion or belief.’*

70. The UCU’s decision was a product of the union’s democratic processes and therefore not ‘unwanted conduct’.

71. It seems to me that the judgment in the Fraser-UCU case constitutes a cautionary tale for anyone who argues that, prima facie, if a Jewish person is offended by criticism of Israel it is as if their protected characteristics of race or religion or belief are affected. Having rejected this, the judge’s final comments were severe:

‘Lessons should be learnt from this sorry saga. We greatly regret that the case was ever brought. At heart it represents an impermissible attempt to achieve a political end by litigious means. It would be very unfortunate if an exercise of this sort were ever repeated’ (p.44).

Two tendencies

⁴⁶ David Feldman, ‘Will Britain’s new definition of antisemitism help Jewish people? I’m sceptical’, *Guardian*, 28 December 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/28/britain-definition-antisemitism-british-jews-jewish-people>

⁴⁷ Case Number: 2203290/2011 Judgment of the Employment Tribunal, Claimant Mr R. Fraser and Respondents University and College Union, Reasons for the Reserved Judgment, 22 March 2013.

72. During this period one could say that two tendencies have been discernible when it comes to the nature and scope of what is understood to be antisemitism and the relationship between that and political comment on Israel.
73. In the effort to protect Jewish people from antisemitism, one tendency has been to extend the boundaries of what is understood to be the nature and scope of antisemitism, and doing that by putting faith in the power of definitions which provide examples of antisemitic hate speech against Israel. And this involves drawing into this net what many would regard as acceptable, if trenchantly expressed, political comment.
74. It is interesting and relevant to note, however, that the Law Commission's 23 September 2020 *Hate Crime Laws: A Consultation Paper 250* provides a definition of antisemitism in its opening pages: '*When we refer to antisemitism in this paper, we refer to hatred, prejudice or discrimination against Jews or Judaism. We do however acknowledge that there are other, more detailed, definitions of antisemitism.*'⁴⁸ It makes no mention of political comment on Israel. And as far as I can see, there is no suggestion in the paper to make the IHRA 'working definition' of antisemitism a document to be used or consulted or referred to in relation to hate crimes against Jewish people.
75. The other tendency has been to draw attention to the need to preserve freedom of speech when it comes to political comment and discussion of antisemitism, anti-Zionism, anti-racism and so on, and to ensure that it covers unrestrained articulation and narration of the past and present experience of Palestinians. And this involves what many Jews and Jewish and pro-Israel organizations believe to be allowing unacceptable speech on Israel and Zionism, speech that crosses the line from anti-Zionism to antisemitism, or even proves to them that the two are one and the same. This makes for a messy reality, but it is reality nonetheless.
76. The historian and memory studies scholar Professor Michael Rothberg and his colleague, English scholar Dr Neil Levi argue that we have moved into a new, unsettled political context in which Jews and Jewishness occupy very ambivalent positions: because of their absolute commitment to Israel:
- 'Conservative Jews can be networked into ethno-nationalist alliances, but Jews as a group also remain targets of the far-right. Meanwhile, many Jews have aligned themselves with the multiracial social movements of the left, yet Jewishness and the status of antisemitism remain sources of unease and tension in such coalitions, not least because of the vexed Israel/Palestine question.'*⁴⁹
77. Rothberg further points out that while charges of antisemitism are actively being promoted by Israel and its allies around the world in the context of the anti-BDS campaign, there has been a '*shocking rise of violent antisemitism in recent years*', including armed attacks and murders,

⁴⁸ <https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jxou24uy7q/uploads/2020/10/Hate-crime-final-report.pdf>, 1.

⁴⁹ <https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jxou24uy7q/uploads/2020/10/Hate-crime-final-report.pdf>, 1.

not without connection to Donald Trump becoming President of the USA, but these are coming from the far-right, not from critics of Israel.⁵⁰

78. Rothberg does not deny that there is antisemitism on the left or among critics of Israel. *‘But the attention to them at the expense of focus on the far right has made Jews (and racialized minorities) more vulnerable, and it has allowed actively antisemitic regimes, like those in Hungary and Poland—not to mention Trump’s White House—to legitimate themselves through alliance with Netanyahu’s government. The world has been turned upside down when antisemites like Orban and Trump consort with Jewish leaders, while Jews who are critical of the occupation of Palestine are targeted as “antisemites.”’*⁵¹
79. New factors affecting how antisemitism is understood and whether it is right or wrong to put any constraints on political comment on Israel are sure to emerge. I suggest that developments in the period 2005 to 2018 only made it more difficult and more complicated over this time to disentangle hate speech and political comment.

‘The Elastic View’: The 2017 JPR report Antisemitism in Contemporary Britain

80. Towards the end of the period under review some important clarification of what we should understand when talking about antisemites and antisemitism emerged in a major study by the highly respected Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) in September 2017, based on a dataset containing 5,466 observations. This was the result of more than a decade of a great deal of serious survey research, conducted in partnership with EU research bodies, on antisemitic attitudes being carried out across Europe. The study in question, focusing on the UK, introduced the idea of ‘the elastic view’ as a new way of thinking about the level of antisemitism in society.⁵²
81. *‘Antisemitism is an attitude, and like all attitudes, it exists in society at different levels of intensity, and with different shades to it. The elastic view explicitly takes this into account: some people may be strongly antisemitic, others less so; and while still others may not fit into either of these categories, they may still hold certain attitudes—even if these are small in number and weak in intensity—that have the potential to make Jews feel offended or uncomfortable. Thus, no single figure can capture the level of antisemitism in a given society.’*
82. *‘Determining what is, and what is not an antisemitic attitude is not always clear. In keeping with the elastic view, we draw a critical distinction between counting anti-Semites—i.e. people who are clearly antisemitic—and measuring antisemitism—i.e. ideas that are commonly perceived by Jews to be antisemitic. The prevalence of the former is marginal in Great Britain; the prevalence of the latter is rather more common.’*⁵³
83. There is no doubt that emphasising ‘measuring’ antisemitism rather than ‘counting’ anti-Semites is highly relevant to the question of when and whether political comment on Israel is antisemitic.

⁵⁰ [Michael](http://lernen-aus-der-geschichte.de/Lernen-und-Lehren/content/14651) Rothberg and Bryan Cheyette, *Lernen aus der Geschichte: Relational Thinking: A Dialogue on the Theory and Politics of Research on Antisemitism and Racism*, Im gesprach. <http://lernen-aus-der-geschichte.de/Lernen-und-Lehren/content/14651>

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² L. Daniel Staetsky, *Antisemitism in Contemporary Britain: A Study of Attitudes Towards Jews and Israel* (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research with the Community Security Trust, September 2017)

⁵³ Ibid., 2-4.

84. Other academic antisemitism experts who have attempted to introduce some clarity into discussion of this question in relation to the problems the Labour Party has been experiencing with confronting allegations of antisemitism within the party have reinforced the importance of Staetsky's distinctions.
85. Feldman, Gidley and McGeever, in both a paper published in the *Political Quarterly*⁵⁴ and an op-ed in the *Guardian*, '*The EHRC report shows how difficult building real anti-racist politics will be*,⁵⁵ emphasise that antisemitism should be seen as a 'reservoir': 'a repository of narratives, representations and stereotypes, embedded deep within our culture, which political actors of all parties may draw on', and that focusing on 'antisemitism' rather than naming and expelling 'antisemites' is a more productive way of combating the problem.

The applicability to political comment on Israel of definitions of antisemitism referred to in law: a summary

86. I conclude with a look at whether or how any definitions of antisemitism used, or potentially usable, in legal cases during this period might throw some light on whether the nature and scope of what was understood as antisemitism tells us something about the extent to which political comment on Israel came under scrutiny as hate speech.
87. As I understand it, there are three ways in which antisemitism was addressed in English law.
88. First, Jews were included in the 1994 Anti-Discrimination (Amendment) Act, which means they were covered by the 1976 Race Relations Act as victims of racial, and not religious, discrimination.⁵⁶ In the Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism, September 2006, MPs defined 'racial discrimination' against Jews in these words:⁵⁷
- 'Broadly, it is our view that any remark, insult or act the purpose or effect of which is to violate a Jewish person's dignity or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for him is antisemitic. This reflects the definition of harassment under the Race Relations Act 1976. This definition can be applied to individuals and to the Jewish community as a whole.'*
89. This, however, was only their opinion. This wording is not included in the Race Relations Act. And I would doubt that it reflects the definition of harassment under the act. It gives an enormous amount of assumed validity to the subjective feelings of the alleged victim.
90. Certainly, as the 1999 Macpherson Inquiry established, any incident perceived by the victim to have been racially aggravated should be recorded as such by the police. But if the case came to court, the legal process would determine whether the claim of the victim was justified.

⁵⁴ Ben Gidley, Brendan McGeever, David Feldman, 'Labour and antisemitism: a crisis misunderstood', *Political Quarterly*, vol. 91 no. 2, April-June 2020.

⁵⁵ David Feldman, Ben Gidley, Brendan McGeever, David Feldman, 'The EHRC report shows how difficult building real anti-racist politics will be', *Guardian*, 3 November 2020.

⁵⁶ Speaking in a House of Lords debate on 9 November 2005, Lord Lester of Herne Hill said: 'It has been clearly established for a quarter of a century, since the decision of Mr Justice Slynn, as president of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, in 1980 in the case of *Seide v Gillette Industries Ltd*, which the noble and learned Lord may remember, that Jews are included within the Race Relations Act only as victims of racial, and not religious, discrimination'. <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo051109/text/51109-12.htm>

⁵⁷ <https://archive.jpr.org.uk/download?id=1274>

91. Second, in its published response to the 2006 All-Party Report, the government addressed the problem of ‘antisemitic discourse’, stating:⁵⁸ *‘When such discourse is expressed in threatening, abusive or insulting terms that incite racial hatred (or are likely to do so) it is a criminal offence, under the Public Order Act 1986.’*
92. Third, as outlined above in relation to the Fraser v UCU tribunal, accusations of antisemitism by Fraser against the UCU were considered under the provisions of the 2010 Equality Act, which superseded the 1976 Race Relations Act. Fraser charged the respondents with ‘institutional antisemitism’, which he said constituted harassment of him as a Jew. The key issue in this litigation was whether the Respondent’s alleged acts and/or omissions constitute unlawful harassment of the Claimant pursuant to sections 57(3) and 26(1) of the Equality Act 2010 and if so, whether the Respondent was liable for such harassment. But one of the claims by Fraser and his lawyers was that Fraser’s Zionist identity, his identification with Israel, was a ‘protected characteristic’, and this was rejected.
93. The Tribunal drew attention to the fact that, in order to judge whether something is antisemitic or not, an agreed definition of antisemitism is required, and no such agreement was apparent. And this disagreement was not confined to the two sides in the dispute. Even among witnesses called for the complainant there were significant differences of view. ‘So, to take one of many examples,’ the judgment states, ‘Mr Whine of the Community Security Trust, an organisation which provides security, training and advice for British Jews, did not consider that comparisons between Israel and apartheid South Africa were inherently anti- Semitic, whereas the Claimant did.’⁵⁹
94. It was clear, at any rate, that the issue of comment and criticism of Israel was felt by some Jews as something to be covered in law. At a symposium organized by the Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck University of London in 2015, a number of experts reviewed the Race Relations Act, beginning from 1965.
95. Commenting on what were then the current feelings of Jews about how the new legal regime protects them, Dr Anastasia Vakulenko suggested that Jewish people felt they could be better protected: ‘Jews are tackling the image that, en masse, they are supporters of an “apartheid state”.’⁶⁰
96. Although strictly speaking, the Equality and Human Rights Commission report on Labour and antisemitism falls outside of the period under review, the events it was considering dated back to 2016 and its legal reference point was the same as that of the Fraser v UCU case. This seems to me to make it appropriate to refer to it in respect of the status of definitions of antisemitism during 2005 and 2018.⁶¹
97. In fact, there is no clear definition of antisemitism anywhere in the more than 100-page EHRC report. Like the Fraser/UCU case, the EHRC were looking for instances of breaches of the

⁵⁸ Report of the [2006] All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry Into Antisemitism: Government Response March 2007 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228610/705_9.pdf

⁵⁹ Fraser/UCU judgment, para 51, p.18.

⁶⁰ <http://blogs.bbk.ac.uk/events/2015/06/19/a-quiet-anniversary-reviewing-the-race-relations-act-1965/>

⁶¹ <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/investigation-into-antisemitism-in-the-labour-party.pdf>


2010 Equality Act—harassment and discrimination ‘*on the basis of a number of protected characteristics, including race and religion*’.

98. But the EHRC only found two cases that were unlawful to the degree that the Labour Party was responsible and therefore legally liable. The report said there were many more cases of harassment and discrimination, but only 19 that might have been serious enough to be considered actionable, but the EHRC decided they were ‘borderline’. Only the two actionable cases are described, albeit briefly. No details of any of the other incidents are given.
99. The report comes close to approaching the question of a definition in respect of political comment on Israel when it states that ‘*Article 10 [of the European Convention on Human Rights] will protect Labour Party members who, for example, make legitimate criticisms of the Israeli government . . . It does not protect criticism of Israel that is antisemitic.*’ Footnote 7 in this paragraph purports to offer guidance on what constitutes this antisemitism: ‘*When we refer to legitimate criticism of Israel, here and elsewhere in the report, we mean criticism that is not antisemitic.*’ Regrettably, this is tautological and of no help whatsoever.
100. The report’s terms of reference state that: ‘*In the course of the investigation, the commission may have regard to the IHRA’s working definition of antisemitism and associated examples, while recognising that it is a non-legally binding definition.*’ But here again we are left none the wiser. ‘May’ or ‘may not’?—the report does not state categorically where it has ‘regard to’ IHRA.
101. Moreover, elsewhere in the report it states that: ‘*Some concerns have been raised about aspects of the IHRA approach*’—saying ‘*we note the approach of the Home Affairs Select Committee*’, which, in 2016, was critical of the IHRA working definition because of its potential to be used to restrict freedom of speech.⁶²
102. It then goes on to say that ‘*we are satisfied that the unwanted conduct we identify in Annex 2 meets the definition of harassment without reference to the IHRA definition and examples. But we are also satisfied that it would meet the IHRA definition and its examples of antisemitism.*’ This is very unsatisfactory for our purposes since the report brings no evidence to back up this last sentence. Moreover, just as in the Fraser/UCU case experts on Fraser’s side could not agree on what constituted antisemitism in respect of comment on Israel, there would certainly be differences among experts as to whether what is deemed ‘unwanted conduct’ in Annex 2 is such or not.
103. It seems to me reasonable to conclude that definitions referred to in formal legal proceedings do not throw a great deal of light on the question of whether and when political comment on Israel was considered antisemitic during the period in question. It only further demonstrates that there was no common consensus during the period, even though there was increasing pressure from some establishment Jewish bodies and anti-antisemitism organizations to make the alleged treatment of ‘Israel as the collective Jew among the nations’ an example of antisemitism.
104. However, the judgment in the Fraser v UCU case as to whether, for a Jew, Zionist identity or pro-Israel sentiment is a protected characteristic in law, was quite definitive in rejecting such a claim.

⁶² <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/136/13602.htm>

Statement of truth

I confirm that I have made clear which facts and matters referred to in this report are within my own knowledge and which are not. Those that are within my own knowledge I confirm to be true. The opinions I have expressed represent my true and complete professional opinions on the matters to which they refer. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

A photograph of a handwritten signature in black ink on a light-colored, textured surface. The signature is written in a cursive style and appears to read 'Antony Lerman'.**Antony Lerman**

20 November 2020

Clergy Discipline Measure 2003

In the Clergy Discipline Tribunal – Diocese of Winchester

Re the Reverend Dr Stephen Robert Sizer

EXHIBIT "A"

CV: ANTONY LERMAN September 2020

Senior Fellow at the Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue, Vienna; Honorary Fellow, Parkes Institute for the Study of Jewish/non-Jewish Relations, Southampton University; Associate Editor Patterns of Prejudice.

Former founding Executive Director, Institute for Jewish Policy Research, JPR, the leading Jewish body focusing exclusively on research into contemporary antisemitism in Europe (1996-99 and 2006-9); former founding Chief Executive, the Rothschild Foundation (Hanadiv) Europe; Founding Editor of Antisemitism World Report (1992-1998), Editor and co-Editor of Patterns of Prejudice, the international academic journal on racism and antisemitism (1986-1999), Assistant Editor, *Survey of Jewish Affairs* (Associated University Presses and Blackwells 1988-92).

Author (forthcoming, Pluto Press, spring 2021), *Whatever Happened to Antisemitism? The Redefinition of a Persistent Hatred*; Joint author (with Greg Philo, Mike Berry, Justin Schlosberg and David Miller of *Bad News for Labour: Antisemitism, the Party and Public Belief* (Pluto Press 2019). Author of *The Making and Unmaking of a Zionist: A Personal and Political Journey* (Pluto Press 2012). Editor, *Do I Belong? Reflections from Europe* (Pluto 2017); Editor and main contributor, *Jewish Communities of the World: A Contemporary Guide* (Macmillan 1989).

Published in various print and online newspapers and periodicals, such as Guardian, Independent, *Ha'aretz*, *New York Times*, *Jewish Chronicle*, *Prospect*, *The Nation*, *London Review of Books*, *New Statesman*, *tachles*, *Aufbau*, *Jewish Socialist*, *Red Pepper*, *openDemocracy*, *Eurozine*, *Jewish Quarterly*, *Middle East Eye*.

Participated in numerous conferences and seminars, as lecturer and panellist, on racism and antisemitism in the United States, Canada, Argentina, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Russia, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sydney, Melbourne, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem.

Contributed many essays and chapters to collective works, most recently 'Antisemitism redefined: Israel's imagined national narrative of endless external threat', in *On Antisemitism: Solidarity and the Struggle for Justice* (2017), curated by Jewish Voice for Peace with a Foreword by Judith Butler, and 'The unfinished business of our own belongings' in Antony Lerman ed., *Do I Belong? Reflections from Europe* (2017).

Member of the Black-Jewish Forum and of the Advisory Committee of the Holocaust Exhibition at the Imperial War Museum; Founding member of the Jewish Forum for Justice and Human Rights and the Independent Jewish Voices steering group; Former Trustee of the Humanitarian Trust and a Board Member of the European Jewish Publication Society. Former Member of the Board of Paideia, the European Institute of Jewish Studies in Stockholm, and a Trustee of the UK Friends of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews. In the early 1990s, member of the Runnymede Trust's Commission on Antisemitism (chaired by Richard Harris, Bishop of Oxford) and from 1998-2000, member of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain chaired by Lord Birkhuk Parekh. Former Jewish Representative on the Faith In Europe Committee, The Churches' European Relations Network.

Graduated from Sussex University in 1976 with a First Class Honours Degree in British and European history; Pursued research at the London School of Economics 1976-78. Lecturer in British History at Brighton Polytechnic, 1976-79; Research Officer, Institute of Jewish Affairs (IJA, research arm of the World Jewish Congress), 1979-1985; Assistant Director, IJA, 1985-1991; Director, IJA, 1991-1996.